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MELDING CIVIL RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTALISM:
FINDING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE'S PLACE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
Tseming Yang*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the environmental justice movement has posed im-
portant challenges to the federal environmental regulatory system, as
well as to environmentalism itself. But what has distinguished the envi-
ronmental justice movement's challenge from those advocating property
rights or deregulation has been its politically liberal rather than conser-
vative origin. As a movement seeking to bring the civil rights move-
ment's ideals to environmental protection, the environmental justice
movement has shown that environmental political liberalism is not neces-
sarily the same as the political liberalism of those concerned with race
and social justice.' The rift has been particularly apparent in the charges
of environmental racism against environmentalists and regulators and
continues to persist in the difficulties that regulators, in particular, have
faced in incorporating the ideals of racial and social justice into the envi-
ronmental regulatory framework.2
As an important explanation for these difficulties, scholars have
pointed to the lack of political power held by minority communities and
the poor as reasons why government regulators have been less responsive
to their concerns.3 However, reliance on such explanations alone ignores
the genuine concern that many environmentalists and regulators have
given these issues and their sincere efforts to overcome such inequalities.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. I am grateful to Sheila Foster,
Eileen Gauna, Shubha Ghosh, Cynthia Ho, Gil Kujovich, Susan Kuo, and Kenneth
Manaster as well as the participants of the 1999 Asian American Legal Scholarship Work-
shop for their valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks
go to Lizbeth Brown, Mateo Davis, Albert Huang, Theresa Labriola, and especially Mi-
chael O'Brien for legal research.
This has been particularly remarkable since some see the environmental movement as
being derivative in many respects of the civil rights movement. See, e.g., Richard J. Laza-
rus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Pro-
tection, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 787, 853-55 (1993) (explaining that the environmental move-
ment adopted many of the predecessor movement's tools, strategies, and rhetorical ap-
proaches); RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 199-213 (1989). Cf. David
A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. Rv. 619, 693-708
(1994) (seeking to provide a liberalism-based justification for environmental regulation).
2 See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
3 See Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots
Resistance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86
CAL. L. REv. 775 (1998).
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Even if such efforts have been insufficient, it would be unfair to describe
their responses as cynical attempts to provide only sham remedies. More
importantly, such explanations ignore the important constraints that the
legal and institutional frameworks impose on the actions of regulators.
The differing frameworks within which environmental justice advo-
cates and environmental regulators operate have significantly shaped the
goals and ideals that each group pursues and explain much about the
challenge that environmental justice has posed to environmental regula-
tion. In a way, the involved groups have had difficulties understanding
each other.
While ongoing dialogue between the environmental justice move-
ment and regulators has led to important progress, continuing severe
criticism of EPA efforts in regard to environmental justice shows that
there still has not been a "meeting of the minds" regarding approaches
and values that should form the basis of appropriate regulation. At the
same time, the failure to identify and better understand these frameworks
has also obscured how both frameworks have non-obvious structural
limitations that make addressing the concerns of the environmental jus-
tice movement very difficult.
The central argument of this Article is that law and policy in civil
rights and environmental protection have been based on drastically dif-
ferent problem paradigms, and that the failure to understand and address
these differences has impeded greater progress in the integration of the
concerns of the environmental justice movement into the traditional envi-
ronmental regulatory framework. 4 Environmental protection .relies in
large part on a conception of environmental degradation identified by
Garrett Hardin in his seminal article Tragedy of the Commons,' as well as
by Rachel Carson in her book Silent Spring.' In contrast, civil rights laws
and cases have in large part responded to issues of discrimination which
4 A "paradigm" in Thomas Kuhn's usage is an accepted model problem which is char-
acteristic of the issues raised in the field. It is thus a pattern or mold to which many other
problems within the field can be analogized. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS viii (2d ed. 1970). I also use the terms ideology and perspective
to describe this type of paradigm thinking.
The paradigms have shaped how those working within it understand their field and the
central social problem they are to address as well as how they should go about solving it.
See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation and the
Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1998); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Begin-
ning, A Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History of Environmental
Law, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in
American Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1276 (1984). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) (presenting several models for understanding the
various strands of constitutional law). Accordingly, the paradigm is an ideal that models a
problem's basic constituents. Here, its usefulness lies in facilitating the elaboration of
thinking, premises, and values that characterize problem-solving and decision-making in
civil rights and environmental protection.
5 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
6 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Fawcett Crest 1964) (1962).
[Vol. 26
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are implicit in the Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion .7
Since environmental justice is a social problem that has implicated
the concern of both civil rights and environmental law, it has brought
these regulatory paradigms into significant contact and forced their rec-
onciliation. To the extent that these paradigms are consistent with each
other, their combination to solve problems within this overlapping area of
regulation is unproblematic. However, to the extent that they conflict or
are inconsistent, their combination creates tensions that manifest them-
selves in the real world as disagreements about appropriate regulatory
responses or conflicts over what are or are not legitimate problems wor-
thy of regulatory attention.
Understanding how these paradigms conflict or are in harmony will
provide not only a better sense of each regulatory system's motivating
premises, values, and shortcomings as regulatory solutions, but also will
provide insights about the debate and how one might address those ten-
sions. These issues are explored in this Article.
Part II provides a brief overview of the environmental justice move-
ment and the issues of racial and social justice it has raised for environ-
mental regulators.
Part III explains how Garrett Hardin and Rachel Carson have influ-
enced environmentalists' and regulators' thinking about the environ-
mental degradation problems that the regulatory system must address. It
also sets out the problems of racism and discrimination that civil rights
law and doctrine have sought to remedy and that are implicit in Brown v.
Board of Education and its progeny. While at one level these paradigm
problems are just stories of how some prominent people and institutions
have thought about environmental degradation and racial discrimination,
a closer examination tells us much about the underlying values and
premises that have come to govern regulatory thinking.
It is important to note here that I am specifically focusing on Brown
as a paradigm of the courts' understanding of discrimination and the ap-
propriate solutions to such issues. A tremendous amount of scholarship,
in particular critical race scholarship, has indicated the limitations of this
understanding. Nevertheless, this description remains important for its
representation of how government officials and those not familiar with
more recent race scholarship understand discrimination.
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It is not my claim that these paradigms provide a complete and
detailed representation of each and every aspect of the environmental regulatory system or
of civil rights law. After all, the construction of ideal-type models is crucial in order to
grasp the overall structure of these two areas of public policy without being overwhelmed
by their complexities and detail. See Frug, supra note 4, at 1282. However, in spite of the
simplification, I do believe that these models provide a fair description of the bulk of envi-
ronmental and civil rights law. It is an analysis of the overall structures that I am interested
in here.
2002]
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Part IV addresses the differing values and regulatory premises that
the contrasting regulatory paradigms give rise to and the tensions that are
created by attempts to superimpose the two systems. The discussion
specifically examines the groups-minorities or a larger collective-that
each system of regulation is primarily intended to protect, the role of
states within the regulatory systems, the role that quantifiable values and
incommensurables play in shaping regulation, the issues that expert
agencies face in incorporating intangibles into their decision-making
processes, and the regulatory limits inherent to each system.
Part V then examines whether these incongruous paradigms can be
reconciled. Their differences can be traced to fundamentally divergent
regulatory value premises: civil rights law is intended to provide protec-
tions against majoritarian pressures, while environmental regulation is
largely designed to enhance majoritarian preferences. However, even
though the environmental justice movement thus poses a fundamental
challenge to the nature and purpose of environmental governance, anti-
discrimination and distributional equity concerns retain a legitimate place
within the environmental regulatory system. Serious reform efforts to the
regulatory process remain necessary and cannot be abandoned in spite of
the accompanying political and practical difficulties.
My objective in this Article is not to justify lack of change and fail-
ure to make significant progress toward the goal of environmental justice.
Rather, it is to emphasize how far away we still are and how much more
needs to be done. Simple fixes that do not commit the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") and the rest of the federal government to ap-
proaching environmental protection in a meaningfully different way will
likely provide only the illusion of progress.'
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
Since the rise of the modern environmental regulatory system in the
late 1960s and early 1970s, commentators and activists involved in racial
justice issues have voiced specific concerns about the distributional im-
pacts of environmental protection efforts on racial minorities.9 They
8 It should be noted that many of the problems elaborated here apply to the state and
local regulation of environmental issues as well. However, they are beyond the scope of
this Article.
9 Scholars have pointed to the discrimination that African Americans and other mi-
norities faced with regard to the provisioning of municipal services during the times of Jim
Crow and racial segregation laws as early examples of environmental injustice. See, e.g.,
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971). In posing the discrimina-
tion struggle as a fight for equal benefits from government works, they can be seen as the
flip-side of the more recent environmental justice complaints regarding unequal treatment
in the distribution of undesirable land uses. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do
With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1001, 1003 n.9 (1993); Lazarus, supra note 1, at 807, 833. In both instances,
residential segregation provided an easy mechanism by which municipalities could not
[Vol. 26
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pointed out that the nation's then-new environmental regulatory system
might allocate resources away from the issues most pressing for racial
minorities to concerns more important to the white middle-class. They
also warned that the newfound focus on environmentalism might distract
the nation from the unsolved problem of discrimination's effects on Afri-
can Americans and other racial minorities.1" Unfortunately, environ-
mental regulators did not respond to this challenge.
It has only been with the beginnings of the environmental justice
movement, and in particular the 1982 Warren County protests, 2 that is-
sues of race, distribution, and fairness have been considered with the
same seriousness and attention devoted to other environmental issues by
regulators and environmentalists. Alleging racism in the disposal of
highly hazardous polychlorinatedbiphenyl ("PCB") wastes in a predomi-
nately African American rural community, the protests demonstrated the
salience of race and equity issues even within environmental protection.
Yet regulators refused to intervene.
Such dramatic images and disturbing claims of racial discrimination
led to studies by the General Accounting Office ("GAO"),13 the Commis-
sion for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ, 4 and others in-
quiring into the correlation of hazardous waste facility siting to the racial
make-up of host communities. The GAO study found that of four offsite
hazardous waste landfills located within the eight-state jurisdiction of
EPA's Region IV, three were located in predominately African American
communities even though they only made up twenty percent of the re-
gion's population. 5 Among the key findings of the Commission for Ra-
only limit the benefits of municipal services such as sanitary sewers, street lighting, and
potable water supplies, but arguably also shift undesirable facilities, such as waste facili-
ties and polluting industries, to minority neighborhoods.
10See Lazarus, supra note 1, at 788-89.
n1 Id. at 789, 836-38 (discussing conscious decision by EPA to enforce anti-discrimi-
nation requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act less than aggressively).
2 See, e.g., Dale Russakoff, As in the '60s, Protesters Rally; But This Time the Foe Is
PCB, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 1982, at Al. In the Warren County, North Carolina, protests, a
community made up predominantly of African American and poor individuals objected to
the establishment of PCB waste disposal site within the county by engaging in civil rights
movement-style acts of civil disobedience such as attempting to block the trucks carrying
the hazardous waste. The community residents were unable to stop the establishment of the
particular PCB waste disposal site itself.
Further accounts of the history and varied perspectives of the environmental justice
movement can be found in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COM-
MUNITIES OF COLOR (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) and CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
13See GAO, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION
WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983) [hereinafter
SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS].
'4 See COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST), Toxic WASTES
AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
,5 See SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS, supra note 13, at 2.
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cial Justice study were that "three of every five African and Hispanic
Americans lived in communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites" and
that "race proved to be the most significant among variables tested in
association with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities."' 6
Other studies found similar disproportionate impacts. 7
Later, a 1992 study by the National Law Journal, examining gov-
ernment enforcement of environmental laws at 1177 Superfund toxic
waste sites, concluded that, "penalties under hazardous waste laws as-
sessed at sites having the greatest white population were about 500 per-
cent higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority popula-
tion.""8 The same study also found that, "[for] all the federal environ-
mental laws aimed at protecting citizens from air, water and waste pollu-
tion, penalties in white communities were 46 percent higher than in mi-
nority communities" 19
The environmental movement itself has not been immune to the ef-
fects of prevailing attitudes about race and the neglect of discrimination,
equity, and fairness concerns within its work. In fact, venerable organi-
zations such as the Sierra Club had chapters during the first half of the
twentieth century whose membership policies, in keeping with the pre-
vailing attitudes of the day, were outright racist.2"
Of course, open racism and bigotry have not been socially accept-
able among most political liberals, including environmentalists, for some
time. However, environmental justice activists also pointed out examples
of more subtle, and perhaps inadvertent racism. For example, the organ-
izational staff make-up of the major environmental organizations has
been almost exclusively white. Furthermore, the concerns that they have
championed in the past, such as wilderness and species preservation is-
sues, have had little relevance for poor and minority communities.2'
16 See COMM'N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at xiii-xiv.
17 See, e.g., BENJAMIN GOLDMAN & LAURA FITTON, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE REVIS-
ITED: AN UPDATE OF THE 1987 REPORT OF THE RACIAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1994); Vicki Been, Coming
to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios? A Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice
Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); see also id., at 5 n.14 (listing numerous other studies
reaching similar conclusions).
18 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, A Special Investigation, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2.
19 1d.
20 See Charles Jordan & Donald Snow, Diversification, Minorities, and the Mainstream
Environmental Movement, in VOICES FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT: PERSPEC-
TIVES FOR A NEW ERA 71, 75-78 (Donald Snow ed., 1992) (noting that the Sierra Club's
California chapters prohibited membership by racial minority individuals up until the
1950s).
21 See MARK DoWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 168 (1995); see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Amid Board Ran-
cor; Sierra Club LDF Loses 2d Black: Staff Attorney Quits and Rekindles Dispute Over
Environmental Racism, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 30, 1995, at A6 (discussing former Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund board member who equated the NAACP with a "black man's Ku Klux
Klan" and described the role of an African American female judge as chair of the board as
[Vol. 26
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 6 2002
Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism
While most of these conditions were unlikely to be the result of outright
racism, they did evince a significant lack of concern about racial dis-
crimination and equity issues.
In light of the close parallels to the civil rights struggles of the 1950s
and 1960s, then-Reverend Benjamin Chavis, Jr., coined the phrase "envi-
ronmental racism" as the problem that the movement sought to address.22
Grass-roots organizing and growth of the movement around waste siting
and other environmental issues eventually culminated in 1991 in the
"First National People of Color Environmental Summit" and much
greater national awareness about the problems of race and equity in envi-
ronmental protection135
Since then, the movement has been successful in prompting federal
responses at a number of levels, as well as drawing responses from the
environmental movement and academic interest. The Clinton Admini-
stration issued a Presidential Executive Order directing federal agencies
to consider the environmental justice implications of their decision-
making. 4 EPA established both an Office of Environmental Justice and a
federal advisory committee, and also promulgated a formal administra-
tive complaint process with regard to disparate impact allegations under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Also, as a response to the
movement, mainstream environmental organizations created projects and
offices to address environmental justice concerns.' Academic attention to
this issue has mushroomed.2 1
Yet the problems of race and equity raised by the environmental jus-
tice movement have remained intractable.27 And the most recent contro-
"'interesting' because in the 40 years I have worked intensely in environmental matters, I
have found total disinterest among children or adults of your race in environmental mat-
ters").
2 According to Chavis:
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policymaking, the
enforcement of regulations and laws, the deliberate targeting of communities of
color for toxic waste facilities, the official sanctioning of the life-threatening
presence of poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the history excluding
people of color from leadership of the environmental movement.
Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 272 (Robert D. Bullard ed.,
1994). See also Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword, in CONFRONTING ENVIRON-
MENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
23 See Grossman, supra note 22, at 274-75; see also DOWIE, supra note 21, at 151-55.24 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 14, 1994).
2 See DOWIE, supra note 21, at 169.
26 See, e.g., Carita Shanklin, Pathfinder: Environmental Justice, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 333
(1997); Robert NV. Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Envi-
ronmental Equity, and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 121 (1994).
2 While many have seen the environmental justice movement as focusing on pollution
control and toxic substance issues, similar discrimination and fairness issues have arisen in
the land and natural resource management context. For example, Native Americans have
been affected through conquest and displacement from their aboriginal lands, see generally
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 7 2002
Harvard Environmental Law Review
versies, involving EPA's guidance to its regulations under Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act as well its 1998 Select Steel decision, seem to amply
bear out these difficulties.
At one level, it should be apparent that the necessary political com-
mitment to these issues is lacking. However, given the genuine and sin-
cere concern expressed by regulators about the problems raised by the
environmental justice movement, it would also be unfair to attribute these
difficulties to bureaucratic recalcitrance or bigotry. Rather, many of the
difficulties can be traced back to differences in how environmental justice
activists and regulators view environmental justice and what they under-
stand the role of the regulatory system to be in addressing them. The
paradigms under which each group has operated provide much insight in
this regard.
III. THE PARADIGMS
There are three paradigms that I will rely on in my analysis. Two of
them have had an enormous impact on shaping our understanding of en-
vironmental regulation: the "prisoner's dilemma" problem that Garrett
Hardin applied to the environmental commons28 and Rachel Carson's in-
sights into the unexpected effects of environmental degradation and the
interdependent relationships within nature.29 These two paradigms will be
contrasted with the paradigm of prejudice and government involvement
in discrimination that were the premises of Brown v. Board of Education,
the case that marked a turning point in modern civil rights law and the
mandates of the equal protection clause.
Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native
American Experience, 34 KANS. L. REV. 713, 733-34 (1986); DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 41-191 (1998); Mexican Americans
through defeat during the Mexican American war and subsequent forfeiture of lands, see
generally PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMER-
ICA 270-75 (2000); Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in The Agrarian
Domain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife," 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998); Japanese
Americans, prior to World War II internment, see United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944), through alien land laws restricting land ownership, see generally Keith
Aoki, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land Laws" as a Prelude to
Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998); and African American slaves, beyond the simple
support and enforcement of slave status, also through other disabilities, such as restrictions
on their right to own property, see, e.g., Bill Quigley & Maha Zaki, The Significance of
Race: Legislative Racial Discrimination in Louisiana, 1803-1865, 24 S.U. L. REV. 145,
174 (1997). It would be much beyond the scope of this Article to review the history of
conquest, subjugation, discrimination, and exploitation of racial minorities in the struggle
for land and resources in greater detail.
28 See HARDIN, supra note 5.
29 But see E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Feder-
alization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (providing a historical
interpretation of the enactment of environmental statutes as a consequence of politically
self-interested actions by President Richard M. Nixon and Senator Edwin Muskie).
[Vol. 26
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A. The Influence of Garrett Hardin and Rachel Carson on
Environmental Protection
The conventional justification for environmental regulation is that it
is a necessary response to market failures in the use of natural resources
or the disposal of pollutants. The classic explication of the market failure
thesis was put forth by Garrett Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons.30
According to Hardin, unregulated and unrestricted access to scarce com-
mon resources creates a dynamic of exploitation by its users. Self-
interest and the inability to exclude each other from the commons drives
a group of rational individuals to use the resource beyond a level that is
optimal with regard to benefits and costs for the group as a whole.
Hardin's example in The Tragedy of the Commons posited a situation
where a common cattle pasture is used at its carrying capacity, i.e., at the
maximum number of cattle that the pasture can support (a resource's
maximum use) without experiencing an overall decline in productivity.
Any more intensive use of the land, i.e., adding one more animal to the
pasture beyond its carrying capacity, would result in an overall net loss of
utility from the use of the land.
In such a situation, a cattle herder who seeks to maximize his gain
from use of the common pasture would face the following decision cal-
culus: He would receive all of the benefits, such as proceeds of the pro-
spective sale, of an additional animal that is allowed to graze on the
communal pasture. At the same time, he would only bear a fraction of the
effects of overgrazing since that burden is shared by all pasture users.
The rational action of a self-interested individual, the quintessential eco-
nomic actor, would be to add another animal to the pasture. That, of
course, results in an overall net loss of utility to the entire group of herd-
ers utilizing the pasture.31 Yet the action would provide a net benefit to
the individual herder. Since every user of the pasture faces the same deci-
sion calculus, the communal pasture ends up being greatly overused, and
the entire community suffers as a result. 32
Strictly speaking, Hardin was not the first to discover the problem of
collective action dynamics. 33 Nor was he the first to understand the prob-
30 HARDIN, supra note 5.31 Id. at 1244.
32 The same dynamic can occur with regard to pollution problems, such as the disposal
of pollutants into the air and water bodies and the consequent sharing of the effects of such
pollution by all. Id. at 1245.33 See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). Hardin's description of the "tragedy of the commons" is a
specific application of the cooperation difficulties that are presented by choices which may
maximize the gains for any particular individual but would not be optimal for others in a
collective group of individuals with the same choice, a problem that is most commonly
described by the "prisoner's dilemma.' See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION (1984); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39-42
(2d ed., 1994).
2002]
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lem of environmental externalities that environmental degradation of
common resources presents. 34 Nor has Hardin's The Tragedy of the Com-
mons been without its critics. 35 However, it has been his conception that
has driven modern environmental regulation and led to approaches seek-
ing to force polluters to bear the costs of the pollution harms they create.
But if Garrett Hardin's seminal The Tragedy of the Commons led
regulators to focus on the underlying economics of environmental degra-
dation, Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring36 forced environmentalists to
look at the ecological and scientific basis of environmental harm and to
understand that the problems causing environmental degradation were
intertwined. 37
The roots of the idea that nature and humans are interconnected-
part of the same web of life-can be traced to many philosophies and re-
ligions, including Native American religion and culture,38 and, more re-
cently, the deep ecology movement. 39 Nevertheless, the modern incarna-
tion of this idea responsible for exerting a significant influence on cur-
rent-day thinking about environmental regulation, has in large part, been
attributed by many scholars to Rachel Carson.40 Her focus on the inter-
connection of the natural environment through various ecological rela-
tionships and pathways and the unavoidable connection of humans to the
environment is seen by some as one of the most important triggers for
our modern pollution control system.
In her 1962 book, Carson detailed the unintended side-effects that
pollution of the air, water, and land by chemicals and pesticides, in par-
ticular by the pesticide dichloro-diphenyltrichloroethane("DDT"), had on
34 See, e.g., A.C. PIGOu, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932).
31 See, e.g., Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inher-
ently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). See also Ronald Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (examining Pigou's premise that differing
liability rules affect the economically efficient use of resources).36 CARSON, supra note 6.
37 Carson, of course, did not do much of the original research to document the harmful
effects of pesticide that she discussed, nor was she the first to write about them. See PHILIP
SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 109 (1993).
38 See, e.g., Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography,
in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 100 (Christopher Vecsey ed.,
1991); see also J. Baird Callicott, American Indian Land Wisdom, in THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE LAND: INDIGENOUS INSIGHT AND INDUSTRIAL EMPIRE IN THE SEMIARID WORLD 255
(Paul A. Olson ed., 1990).
19 See, e.g., Bill Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299
(1980), JAMES LOVELOCK, THE AGES OF GALA: A BIOGRAPHY OF OUR LIVING EARTH
(1988); see also ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC (1949). For an exploration of
the ethical origins of environmentalism, see RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE:
A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1989).
40 See, e.g., J. William Futrell, The History of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY 2, 32-33 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993);
Plater, supra note 4, at 998-1004; Lakshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughtways: Re-
Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 463, 509 (1989).
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the natural environment. By raising public awareness about the various
pathways and interconnections through which chemicals spread through-
out nature, including to humans, she raised disturbing questions about the
hidden dangers that indiscriminate pesticide and chemical use presented.
Her book alerted environmentalists, regulators, and the public to these
important environmental linkages and how the adverse impacts of pesti-
cides on one part of the ecological system, such as on target weeds and
pests, can have unexpected and far-reaching effects on other organisms
and animals.
Carson's book was controversial at the time of its publication. How-
ever, modem science and ecology have confirmed many of her asser-
tions.4' These conclusions have come to be seen as more broadly applica-
ble to the need to address environmental problems comprehensively and
in a scientifically and technically sound fashion. For example, the mod-
em comprehensive environmental statutes have tried to heed such think-
ing, though imperfectly, by creating enormous regulatory structures at
both the state and federal level.42 Through the years, calls for stronger
incorporation of this recognition have continued,43 finding their modem
manifestation in the drive to address environmental problems internation-
ally, regardless of political boundaries.
Modem environmental regulation is thus based on the following
paradigm: environmental degradation is a problem caused by the rational
behavior of human beings in pursuit of individual gain and benefits. Damage
of such degradation to one part of the ecological system can have unex-
pected, significant, and far-reaching impacts on other parts of the eco-
logical system. Regulation is necessary to correct failures by the free
market and independent individual actions to promote the common good.
At the same time, regulation cannot occur in a limited and discrete fash-
ion, but must be carried out by an integrated and comprehensive scheme
in order to be effective.
B. The Influence of Brown v. Board of Education on Civil Rights Law
The problem paradigm upon which civil rights law has been prem-
ised, Brown v. Board of Education,44 has quite different characteristics.
Brown, as it is commonly known, brought an end to officially sanctioned
racial segregation in public education and heralded the demise of the
41 See RODGERS, supra note 33, at 400-03.
42 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7641 (2001). As another example, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000), instituted "a
comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazardous wastes
from cradle to grave." City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994).
41 See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It Is Time for a New Begin-
ning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111 (1989); Guruswamy, supra note 40, at 492-516.
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"separate but equal" doctrine. But at a deeper level, Brown's reliance on
the Constitution's promise of racial equality and the role of the courts in
protecting the rights of racial minority groups also set out a paradigm
that is quite at odds with the paradigms relied upon by environmental
regulators.
Brown found that even though white and African American schools
in racially segregated public school systems had "been equalized, or are
being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and
salaries of teachers, and other 'tangible' factors,"45 a determination of
whether such schools accord the African American children with the
equal protection of the laws could not "turn on merely a comparison of
these tangible factors."46 Rather, consideration of the "effect of segrega-
tion itself on public education" was mandated.47 Since segregation itself
was designed to provide official legal sanction to the notion that one race
was inferior to the other and to impart that notion to school children, seg-
regation deprived the children of the minority group of the equal protec-
tion of the laws. "[I]n the field of public education, the doctrine of 'sepa-
rate but equal' has no place. Separate education facilities are inherently
unequal.
48
At a deeper level, Brown's reliance on the Constitution's promise of
racial equality also emphasized the role of the courts in protecting the
rights of racial minority groups, even if it meant that contrary interests
and desires of the political majority were thwarted. At the same time, the
law's solicitude toward the rights of racial minorities reached far beyond
particular tangible harms. Thus, maintenance of a system of racial segre-
gation, even though other tangible factors between white and African
American schools were equal, was still illegal.49 Segregation's message
of inequality among the races and the notion that one race was inherently
inferior to the other were themselves inconsistent with the equal protec-
tion clause. 0
Brown was, of course, not the first case in which the Supreme Court
had found an aspect of segregation to be constitutionally impermissible .5
However, it was the first instance in which the Court faced the constitu-
tionality of segregation as a government policy forthrightly and banished
racial segregation not only from public schools but also all other areas of
government.12
45 Id. at 492.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 /d. at 495.
49 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
S0 See id. at 495.
"' See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (finding that a segregated law school for
African Americans could not provide them equal educational opportunities).5
-
2 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-4
(1979).
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Brown has not been without its critics. In spite of its tremendous im-
pact on the permissibility of government-sponsored discrimination,
Brown and its progeny cases have been criticized for being less than fully
effective in actually undoing the consequences of such discrimination.53
In fact, Brown's focus on the Fourteenth Amendment's provision
that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws" and on how segregation in public education
violated the prohibition54 conceived of discrimination not only as actions
by government entitities but also as the result of specific actions with evil
intent. After all, the equal protection clause did not specifically speak to
the effects of discrimination. Rather, it prohibited the active engagement
in discrimination-the denial of equal protection-by states. In that
sense, it foreshadowed many of the limitations that later cases would im-
pose on the reach of much anti-discrimination law, in particular discrimi-
nation that did not result from any specifically identifiable actor.55
As a result, the Brown paradigm gave us a picture of discrimination
that was particularly concerned not only with protecting minorities
against the whims of the majority, but also emphasized that the intangible
aspects of discrimination were just as important to the law as the tangible
ones. At the same time, the Brown paradigm led to a model of civil rights
law that was quite limited in its vision of the role of the law and govern-
ment in protecting minorities.
C. Putting the Paradigms Together
The characteristics of the paradigms have had a special significance
with regard to the concerns of the environmental justice movement. The
problem that Brown and its civil rights progeny have sought to avoid-
minority oppression by the majority-has been antithetical to the
concerns of environmental regulators, who have largely seen their
mission as the protection of the majority against the self-interested
actions of the individual or small special interest groups. Their differing
regulatory structures reflect these differing concerns through the roles
that they assign to courts, administrative agencies, and state and local
governments.
53 See, e.g., Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. RIv. 1049
(1978).
'4 Brown, 347 U.S. at 491-93 (focusing on public education and the notion that "edu-
cation is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments").
55 Discriminatory impact is insufficient to establish equal protection violations. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977). Some statutory civil rights provisions do reach disparate impacts not
directly connected to identifiable bigoted actions, though they tend to be the exception.
See, e.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2 (1983) (acknowl-
edging that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows federal agencies to promulgate
and implement regulations prohibiting discriminatory impacts).
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At the same time, the paradigms have also led to different methodo-
logical approaches to regulation. By pointing to the importance of eco-
nomic analysis and scientific knowledge, environmental regulation has
heavily emphasized quantitative approaches to regulation. In contrast,
Brown's focus on intangibles and unquantifiables has stressed the signifi-
cance of incommensurables.
Finally, Brown's emphasis on the government-sponsored and inten-
tional aspects of discrimination foreshadowed the limited scope of civil
rights law as a solution to discrimination more generally. In stark con-
trast, the idea of the interconnectedness of environmental problems under
Hardin's and Carson's paradigms has promoted a strong ideal of regula-
tory comprehensiveness.
IV. THE CHALLENGE OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE TO
THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY PARADIGM
A. The Problem of Minority Protection and the Empty Promise of
Devolution and Local Control for Environmental Justice
Under Garrett Hardin's explication of "the tragedy of the commons,"
the quintessential focus of environmental regulation is on actions by in-
dividuals that, while advantageous and beneficial to that particular indi-
vidual, are harmful for the community overall. The result is that envi-
ronmental regulation, like many other forms of government regulations,
is primarily directed at protecting the collective from the irresponsible or
selfish actions of individuals or small groups.
That perspective is entirely reversed in anti-discrimination law. The
underlying premise of Brown v. Board of Education is that prejudice and
minority oppression requires the law to focus its protections on minority
groups against the majority. Because it was necessary to protect African
Americans against continuing discrimination and oppression by whites
following the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause was specifically designed to be counter-majoritarian in charac-
ter.
56
The regulatory structures within environmental law and civil rights
law have reinforced these divergent goals. Environmental protection is
promoted largely through administrative agencies controlled by the po-
56 Of course, under normal democratic processes, almost every individual or group in-
evitably ends up on the losing side of a government decision eventually. However, preju-
dice and other impediments to normal political and legislative coalition-building can create
dynamics within which particular groups, such as racial minorities, are unable to utilize the
political process to protect themselves against consistently unfair treatment by the major-
ity. See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See generally
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-70
(1980).
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litical branches while the rights of minorities are safe-guarded through
the counter-majoritarian courts. 57
These divergent understandings are also at the heart of much criti-
cism by environmental justice advocates that many health and environ-
mental standards are insufficiently protective of racial minorities and the
poor. Precisely because regulatory standards are intended to achieve the
greatest good for the greatest number of people, such standards fail to
take into account the special characteristics and vulnerabilities of minor-
ity populations and the poor.58
For example, studies have shown that some poor and racial minority
groups consume significantly more fish caught in contaminated water
bodies than their white, male counterparts because of their reliance on it
as an important subsistence supplement to their diet. 9 Yet, pollution lim-
its set by agencies to protect humans from toxins accumulated in fish
have traditionally been based on the consumption patterns of white, male
sport fishers. Not surprisingly, racial minority groups and the poor have
suffered exposure to much higher levels of pollutants and toxins. 60
The failure of environmental law to sufficiently consider the special
needs of minority groups also explains the problems associated with de-
volving control over environmental decision-making, in particular the
siting of hazardous waste facilities, to local governments.
Delegating waste facility siting decisions to local government bodies
has occurred in part as a response to discrimination claims and concerns
about the lack of local community input into such siting decisions. The
goal of such efforts has been to increase the affected community's par-
" For a discussion of courts and adjudication as mechanisms for regulation, see CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE
111-59 (1990); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 393, 403-09 (1981) (describing common law adjudication as incremental regula-
tion); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 357
(1978). What I call majoritarian orientation others have referred to as pluralistic. See, e.g.,
Gauna, supra note 4, at 19-28.
58 See Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of Quantitative Risk
Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 103, 121-29 (1996). Some commentators have attributed
the law's shortcomings in protecting racial minorities primarily to the obstacle that the
discriminatory intent requirement that Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), imposes
for most discrimination remedies. See, e.g., Rachel Godsil, Remedying Environmental
Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 408-09 (1991). While that description is, of course, accu-
rate in its reference to a particular doctrinal deficiency, a singular focus on this doctrinal
aspect obscures the deeper and more fundamental structural shortcomings of civil rights
law that this doctrinal shortcoming evidences. See infra discussion in Part IV.C.
59 See Patrick West et al., Minorities and Toxic Fish Consumption: Implications for
Point Discharge Policy in Michigan, in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND
SOLUTIONS 124 (Bunyon Bryant ed., 1995).
60 See, e.g., Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Con-
taminated Fish, and "Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 11-14
(2000). A similar case can be made with regard to the toxic exposures of farmworkers,
many of whom are members of racial minority groups. See, e.g., GAO, PESTICIDES-IM-
PROVEMENTS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF FARMWORKERS AND THEIR CHILDREN
(2000).
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ticipation within the siting process. However, commentators who have
examined such local government-based approaches have been critical of
their practical effectiveness. 6' In many instances, such measures have not
been able to resolve the complaints of adversely affected minority com-
munities.
An examination of the paradigms explains why. Brown's scrutiny of
state-sponsored intentional discrimination has led to a structural distrust
of state and local governments regarding the protection of racial minori-
ties that finds no equivalent in the cooperative partnership between the
federal government and states in environmental regulation. This distrust
should not come as a surprise in light of the long history of exploitation
and victimization of racial minorities, during periods of time when man-
agement of environmental issues, including land and natural resource
use, was in fact largely controlled by state and local governments. The
reality has been that within such local government entities, government
officials have not been particularly responsive or politically accountable
to racial minority groups and the poor for a variety of reasons. 61
That is not to say that such approaches have entirely failed, and
some successes have been documented. But such successes can be ex-
pected to be the exception rather than the norm.63 After all, even in the
absence of racial prejudice, it may be simply too much to expect state
and local governments to act contrary to political pressures of powerful
local political constituencies or majority sentiments to maximize eco-
nomic development and to attract jobs. This will be especially true dur-
ing times of economic hardship, when looking beyond self-interest to the
needs of the politically weak and disenfranchised will be particularly
difficult. In many ways, relying on states or local governments to resolve
61 See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 58, at 402-08; Luke Cole, The Theory and Reality of
Community-based Environmental Decisionmaking: The Failure of California's Tanner Act
and Its Implications for Environmental Justice, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 733 (1999); see also
KENNETH MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND JUSTICE: READINGS AND COM-
MENTARY ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE 200-09 (1995).62 Within such local government entities, racial minorities may constitute a minority of
voters or otherwise may not be able to wield much political influence. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 522-23 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 82-84 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (citations omitted):
The struggle for racial justice has historically been a struggle by the national so-
ciety against oppression in the individual States. And the struggle retains that
character in modern times .... The smaller the society, the fewer probably will
be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the com-
pass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute
their plan of oppression."
63 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 61 (examining instances of success and failures of local
control approaches).
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discrimination issues resembles the old adage of asking the fox to guard
the hen house.
B. Quantitative Analysis and the Importance of Intangibles
The paradigms have also had an important influence on the role that
quantifiable and intangible values have played in regulation. Both Car-
son's Silent Spring and Hardin's Tragedy of the Commons have led to an
increased reliance on quantifiable, measurable considerations.
Carson's account of pesticides illustrated all too clearly the lack of
understanding humans have had of the effects of such chemicals and,
more broadly, about the wider impacts of pollution and environmental
degradation on the ecological system. While her message was one of
caution, regulators also saw a solution within the warning she raised. If
our lack of knowledge about the impacts of environmental degradation
and the intricate interconnections of the natural world was one reason for
environmental harm, the solution to preventing harm and restoring the
environment would surely be better scientific understanding of environ-
mental problems. The scientific view of environmental problems has ac-
cordingly led to an increased reliance on scientific and technical analysis
to understand and solve environmental degradation problems.
Hardin's model of environmental degradation as a consequence of
rational self-interest and market failure has had similar consequences.
Essentially an economic explanation for environmental degradation, this
paradigm's influence has come from its ability to explain environmental
degradation and the behavior of industrial entities so well. Use of eco-
nomic analysis has given environmental regulators a tool to balance the
benefits of environmental protection with the costs of pollution reducing
technologies and the foregone benefits of industrial resource use and
pollution.
Scientific and economic analysis of environmental problems has
provided some important analytical clarity and improved environmental
decision-making in many respects. However, it has also undermined envi-
ronmental regulation because of its heavy reliance on quantifiable infor-
mation as the most important input for decision-making. 64 Intangibles or
incommensurables are generally left out of the analysis. The importance
of scientific uncertainty, the unknown, and other factors, such as process
and distributional values, are devalued.65 And since quantifiables tend to
64 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. Rav. 1669, 1704-11 (1975).
6 See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985)
(suggesting that the pervasiveness of uncertainty in environmental regulation significantly
diminishes the effectiveness of economic analysis in achieving environmental protection
goals); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of
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be more impressive, easy to grasp, and easy to identify, they overpower
and dominate the unquantifiable aspects of the regulatory decision-
making process. The result has been that even if the quantitative analysis
is true to the input, it is also a construct of reality that provides only par-
tial answers. And while the overall outcome is suspect as a result of ig-
noring qualitative factors, it nevertheless possesses the mantle of preci-
sion and objectivity.66
Of course, quantifiable economic impacts and other practical conse-
quences of discrimination were also significant to the life experiences of
racial minorities during segregation by limiting the economic, educa-
tional, and other opportunities and avenues available to them. At a mini-
mum, it simply made life more expensive and created obstacles to im-
proving one's economic welfare. 67 It is unlikely that such considerations
were not also an important target of anti-discrimination laws.
However, in civil rights law, the focus is on the incommensurables-
especially the importance of the value of equality. Brown made this clear
when it declared that even if "the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal, ... [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently
unequal."6 Justice Goldberg once stated of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
that its "primary purpose.., is the vindication of human dignity and not
mere economics. 69
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 592-603 (1992) (arguing that risk
analysis is a poor substitute for necessary moral judgments about environmental protec-
tion).
Of course, criticisms of the use of economic analysis and assertions about the impor-
tance of ethical concerns about nature and other intangible values have abounded in the
past. See, e.g., ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 68-69 (1996); see also Mark Sagoff, The Principles of Federal Pollution
Control Law, 71 MINN. L. REV. 19, 24-44 (1986); Mark Sagoff, Can Environmentalists Be
Liberals? Jurisprudential Foundations of Environmentalism, 16 ENVTL. L. 775, 782-83
(1986) (describing environmentalist appeals to the "rights and interests of animals and
other natural things" as the environmental equivalent of deontology according to Kant);
Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think about Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environ-
mental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
In addition, an understanding of the unquantifiable values of wildlife and nature has
found its expression in various natural resources statutes, such as the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994), and the International Dolphin Conservation Program
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 11 Stat. 1122 (1997). See also Mark Sagoff, Settling America or
the Concept of Place in Environmental Ethics, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL.
L. 349 (1992).
However, in spite of such significant contributions to environmental regulation of
moral and other intangible values, they represent only a minority tradition. The most visi-
ble, if not the most important, justifications for federal environmental legislation have been
market failure and economic efficiency concerns.
66 See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Pro-
cess, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1358-68 (1971).
67 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964)
(illustrating the difficulties that segregation and discrimination imposed on African Ameri-
can travelers).68 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).69 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 291 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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1. The Controversy over EPA's Definition of Environmental Justice
The problem of giving proper weight to qualitative factors has mani-
fested itself prominently in debates about how environmental justice
ought to be defined. One early EPA report, issued in 1992, is illustrative.
In this report, EPA utilized the term "environmental equity" to convey its
understanding and view of environmental justice concerns:
Environmental equity refers to the distribution of environmental
risks across population groups and to our policy responses to
these distributions. While there are many types of equity, all of
which are important to EPA, ... this report focuses on racial
minority and low-income populations ....
EPA chose the term environmental equity because it most read-
ily lends itself to scientific risk analysis. The distribution of en-
vironmental risks is often measurable and quantifiable. The
Agency can act on inequities based on scientific data. Evaluat-
ing the existence of injustices and racism is more difficult be-
cause they take into account socioeconomic factors in addition
to the distribution of environmental benefits that are beyond the
scope of this report. Furthermore, environmental equity, in con-
trast to environmental racism, includes the disproportionate risk
burden placed on any population group, as defined by gender,
age, income, as well as race.70
This singular focus on the distribution of pollution harms and risks
has been criticized by environmental justice advocates as missing their
point.71
To activists, environmental justice is a much more holistic concept
that includes the right to a safe, healthy, productive, and sustainable envi-
ronment for all. In this context, the "environment" is considered to in-
clude the ecological, physical, social, political, aesthetic, and economic
environments. Environmental justice thus refers to the conditions in
which such a right can be freely exercised, whereby individual and group
identities, needs, and dignities are preserved, fulfilled, and respected in a
way that provides for self-actualization and personal and community
empowerment.72
70 EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 2, 10
(1992).71 See, e.g., Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641 (1992); Eileen Gauna,
Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives on the Road to Envi-
ronmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27-29 (1995).
72 See FIRST NAT'L PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVTL. LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, PRINCIPLES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (1991), reprinted in MARK DowE, LOSING GROUND, supra note
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The contrast between the two views is remarkable. The EPA's tech-
nocratic definition focuses almost exclusively on quantifiable and meas-
urable aspects of risk distribution. In contrast, the activist definition en-
compasses holistic considerations ranging from ecological and physical
factors to political and aesthetic ones. In a sense, what activists have
been looking for are not just the minimum conditions necessary for hu-
man survival but also factors necessary for human thriving and quality of
life. Concerns such as providing for aesthetically appealing and livable
communities, places where pollution, odors, and traffic associated with
industrial facilities do not make it impossible to enjoy and play in one's
backyard, connect with neighbors, and have a good night's sleep are
therefore indispensable. 73
Activists see the difference between the two views not just as a sim-
ple misunderstanding or difference in views of the environmental justice
movement's goals. Rather, they perceive it as an attempt at undermining
the movement. By defining environmental justice in analytically familiar
terms that could easily be incorporated into its way of doing business, the
radical nature of the environmental justice movement and the challenge it
posed to traditional environmental regulation could be neutralized and
subverted.
To its credit, since that 1992 report, EPA appears to have taken the
activists' criticism to heart, and its official view of environmental justice
has moved considerably closer to encompassing intangibles. 74 However,
21, at 284-85; see also Karl Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, supra
note 12, at 274-75.
73 For example, a largely poor and minority community in Chester, Pennsylvania tells
of the following:
During the summer, the stench and noise force residents to retreat into their
dwellings. Recent visitors to Chester are quoted as saying that the "air is thick
with acrid smells and, often, smoke. Dump trucks rumble through throughout the
day, and the first thing you notice is the smell." ... [H]uge trucks ... would rum-
ble through their neighborhoods at all times of the day and night, disturbing their
sleep and their children's recreational time, and damaging the overall character
and peace of their community. Noise and vibration from the constant stream of
waste trucks have caused the foundations of nearby houses to crack and property
values to plummet. Residents have felt imprisoned in their own community.
Sheila Foster, Justice From the Ground Up, 86 CAL. L. REV. 775, 780 (1998).
14 See EPA, Environmental Justice, at http://es.epa.gov/oecalmainlej/index.html (last
visited Oct. 5, 2001) (on file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review):
Environmental Justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the de-
velopment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations,
and policies. Fair treatment means that no group of people, including a racial,
ethnic, or socioeconomic group, should bear a disproportionate share of the nega-
tive environmental consequences resulting from industrial, municipal, and com-
mercial operations or the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal programs
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EPA's heavy reliance on technical and quantitative analysis in the proc-
essing of administrative complaints under its regulations implementing
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act casts considerable doubt on whether
EPA's change is real"
2. The Select Steel Decision and the Problem of Expert
Agency Decisionmaking
The failure to take seriously the significant burden that some intan-
gible and incommensurable aspects of environmental regulation can im-
pose on the poor and minorities also explains some of the difficulties that
EPA has encountered in adapting its administrative processes to envi-
ronmental justice claims. This has been apparent in the only on-the-
merits EPA decision to date regarding allegations of discrimination under
EPA's disparate impact regulations implementing Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act.
In the Select Steel matter, EPA found that concerns regarding the air
quality impacts of a proposed steel recycling mini-mill in Genesee,
Michigan did not rise to the level of discriminatory impacts within the
meaning of Title VI and EPA's implementing regulations.76 In dismissing
the administrative complaint, EPA relied largely on findings that individ-
ual emissions of various pollutants, including volatile organic com-
pounds, lead, air toxics, and dioxin would not lead to violations of appli-
cable national ambient air quality standards and other state requirements.
EPA's decision has been criticized for being based on factually
wrong premises.77 But more importantly, the focus on particular
quantifiable pollutants raises the question of whether compliance with
standards adequately addresses the complainants' concerns about the
proposed steel mill's impact on the community. After all, EPA's analyti-
cal approach ignores not only non-quantifiable and intangible impacts,
but also the overall cumulative effect of such intangible and various
quantifiable impacts in the aggregate. And it is the totality of such im-
pacts that citizens in the community are exposed to in daily life and that
is most palpable to them. 78
and policies.
75 See infra Part IV.B.2.
76 See Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA, Office of Civil Rights, to Father Phil
Schmitter, Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, St. Francis Prayer Center, and Russell J.
Harding, Director, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, (Oct. 30, 1998), avail-
able at http://www.epa.gov/region5/steelevr.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) (on file with the
Harvard Environmental Law Review). See also Luke Cole, "Wrong on the Facts, Wrong on
the Law": Civil Rights Advocates Excoriate EPA's Most Recent Yitle VI Misstep, 29
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,775 (1999).
r' See Cole, supra note 76 at 10,777 (arguing that belief of compliance with air quality
standards for ozone was false).78See NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TECHNOL-
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In some respects, the failure of the administrative process to address
the substance of such disparate impact claims should not be surprising.
After all, the process and its methodology are designed to inquire into
specific quantitative measures of disparities, numbers that may not exist
in the form demanded by EPA's analytical method. As a result, without
an approach significantly different from its traditional decision-making
processes, EPA's Title VI administrative process is unlikely to be satis-
factory for environmental justice advocates.79
C. The Limits of Regulation: The Debate About the Market Dynamics
Cause of Disparate Hazardous Waste Facility Siting
As noted previously, the idea of the environment as an intercon-
nected whole has formed the basis for comprehensive approaches to envi-
ronmental protection. Such approaches have sought to regulate a wide
range of environmentally degrading activities, ranging from private indi-
vidual behavior to commercial and industrial activities." In doing so,
federal environmental laws have sought to adopt a holistic, system-based
view of a problem rather than focusing only on particular aspects of it.
Under the environmental regulatory paradigm, the desirability and
acceptability of human activities and decisions are judged by their harm-
ful or beneficial impact on the environment. There are no areas of human
activity that are automatically or inherently off-limits if judged harmful
to the environment. Within this framework, the key question is: Does it
tend to harm, directly or indirectly, the environment? If it does, the ac-
tivity is considered the legitimate subject of government regulation.
In contrast, consider the limitations on discrimination remedies that
have arisen out of the Brown paradigm.8 Little of the holistic and com-
OGY, REPORT OF THE TITLE VI IMPLEMENTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE: NEXT STEPS FOR
EPA, STATE, AND LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE PROGRAMS 57-65, 70-75 (Mar. 1,
1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocrpagel/t6faca.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2001) (on
file with the Harvard Environmental Law Review).
79 The need for an effective EPA administrative process has become more important
after Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001), which found no private right of action
to enforce EPA's Title VI disparate impact regulations.
80 See, e.g., Pollution Prevention Policy Statement, 54 Fed. Reg. 3845, 3847 (Jan. 26,
1989) ("EPA believes that the development of a comprehensive multi-media pollution pre-
vention policy offers enormous promise for improvements in human health protection and
environmental quality."); Pollution Prevention Strategy, 56 Fed. Reg. 7849 (Feb. 26, 1991);
RODGERS, supra note 33, at 59-60.
Si As I noted in the introduction, my argument here is not that no other relevant
authoritative case law exists in anti-discrimination law nor that Brown necessarily is on
point for all areas of anti-discrimination law. Rather, Brown and its progeny are represen-
tative of the limitations on the government's and the courts' power to regulate and redress
discrimination. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See also Sandoval, 531 U.S. at 1049 (determining that dis-
parate impact regulations promulgated by agencies under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
cannot be enforced directly by private individuals).
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prehensive perspective of environmental regulation is evident in tradi-
tional civil rights jurisprudence. 2 Brown's progeny have limited not only
the remedies to discrimination, as the school desegregation cases have
shown, but also the reach of civil rights protections themselves by im-
posing the discriminatory intent requirement.
These contrasts also shed some light on the debate that has haunted
empirical studies of the siting of hazardous waste facilities and other
waste disposal facilities in minority neighborhoods: What is the cause of
the disproportionate presence of hazardous waste disposal facilities in
poor and minority communities? Is it due to the racial and socioeconomic
characteristics of the community, or is it traceable to other causes?83
Environmental justice activists have claimed that such dispropor-
tionate waste facility siting is the result of discrimination in site selec-
tion. Yet an alternative theory advanced by Vicki Been has pointed to the
role of market dynamics. According to market dynamics theory, the ex-
planation for the disparate impacts on racial minority communities is not
that waste facilities are intentionally sited in such communities, but
rather that racial minority and poor communities form around such fa-
cilities.
Thus, a community surrounding a waste facility can acquire its racial
minority or poor character either by the facility causing "those who can
afford to move to ... leave the neighborhood [or] by making the neigh-
borhood less desirable, ... decreas[ing] the value of the neighborhood's
property, [and] making the housing more available to lower income
households and less attractive to higher income households."' 4 Combined
with other forms of housing discrimination elsewhere, the neighborhood
may become poorer and acquire a greater racial minority population than
before.85
The market dynamics theory thus posits that external market forces
create the racial and socio-economic character of the neighborhood after
the siting of a waste facility; such communities do not pre-exist the siting
decisions. This conclusion is significant to environmental justice be-
cause, "if the disproportionate distribution of locally undesirable land
uses ("LULUs") results from market forces which drive the poor, re-
gardless of their race, to live in neighborhoods that offer cheaper housing
82 Cf Milliken, 418 U.S. at 758 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (unsuccessfully argu-
ing that comprehensive metropolitan solution to school desegregation efforts should be
permissible just as "[m]etropolitan treatment of... a sewage problem or a water problem,
or an energy problem ... would stay well within federal constitutional bounds" and "is
commonplace").
83The answer to the question of whether such disparities exist seems fairly settled. See
Been, supra note 17.
"Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Dispro-
portionate Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388-89 (1994).
9Id. at 1389.
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because they host LULUs, then the fairness of the distribution becomes a
question about the fairness of our market economy. 86
In keeping with its controversial assertions, the market dynamics
theory has been criticized for conflating normative judgments about the
causation of disproportionately distributed hazardous waste facilities
with factual inquiries into whether the racial minority make-up of a
neighborhood preceded the decision to site a facility or came in its
wake. 7 After all, "if existing racially discriminatory processes in the
housing market, for instance, contribute to the distribution of environ-
mental hazards, then it is entirely appropriate to call such outcomes un-
just, and even racist."8
Market dynamics theory and Been's argument that it fundamentally
changes the question of racial justice into a question of economic justice
also reveal the incompatibilities of the environmental and civil rights
paradigms. In her explanations of the significance of market dynamics,
Been has been careful to point out the contributions of racial segregation
and other forms of discrimination in such dynamics.89 However, the clear
import of her market dynamics argument is that if it turns the question
about the "fairness of the distribution [into] a question about the fairness
of our market economy," then race is no longer the relevant issue.' By
implication, such disparate impacts are outside of the problem of envi-
ronmental racism.
Under Brown and its progeny civil rights doctrines, this is unsur-
prising. If no specific culpable bad actor with discriminatory intent or a
discrete set of discriminatory events can be identified, traditional anti-
discrimination analysis provides no remedy. However, that does not mean
that there is no discrimination problem. Rather, it is a "simple" case of
discriminatory impact, traceable to and presumably connected to larger
social issues and problems of discrimination. It is thus outside of the
purview of traditional government regulatory responsibility.9 The market
86 Id. at 1391. Been's most recent national studies appear to indicate that racial minor-
ity communities surrounding hazardous waste disposal facilities generally preceded the
siting of the facilities in their midst. Others, however, have provided empirical evidence
apparently supporting the operation of market dynamics in particular instances. See, e.g.,
Thomas Lambert & Christopher Boerner, Environmental Inequity: Economic Causes, Eco-
nomic Solutions, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 195, 203-12 (1997) (examining waste facility siting
in St. Louis, Missouri).
87 Foster, supra note 3, at 793-98.
88 Id. at 798; see also Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Ra-
cism, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 839, 839 (1992).
89 Been, supra note 84, at 1390.
90 Id. at 1391. See also David Schoenbrod, Environmental 'Injustice' Is About Politics,
Not Racism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1994, at A21. According to David Schoenbrod,
"[a]lthough minority communities have a disproportionate share of environmental prob-
lems, research suggests that the cause is not necessarily racial discrimination. Environ-
mental hazards are likely to be placed in any community that either lacks political power
or is willing to accept risks because they create jobs or generate taxes."
91 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Such thinking in environmental law is, of
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dynamics theory thus implicitly chooses the anti-discrimination paradigm
as the limiting principle for understanding environmental justice issues.
However, following this line of reasoning is unsupportable from an
environmental perspective. Market dynamics theory assumes that the so-
cial phenomena it describes are somehow outside of the legitimate scope
of problems that, like the human desires to consume natural resources,
ought to be the subject of environmental regulatory action. Yet, if we take
seriously the environmentalist's tenet that everything is connected to eve-
rything else, how can we do so in a principled fashion?
The environmental regulatory system has not shied away from
seeking to change human behavior and social and economic practices on
a large scale to protect the environment. Promotion of public transporta-
tion to reduce air pollution, imposition of numerous detailed environ-
mental statutory and regulatory requirements to change behavior within
industry, and the use of economic incentives and market mechanisms
have demonstrated this clearly. The phenomena that are described as
market dynamics, to the extent that they contribute to excessive and dis-
parate levels of pollution in some communities, are no different. 92
The decision to label the phenomena in such a fashion, and thus
place them outside of the scope of ordinary government protections, ob-
scures the obligation that environmentalists and regulators might other-
wise be under to take such phenomena into account. In essence, the mar-
ket dynamics perspective makes it that much easier for environmentalists,
government regulators, and industry to absolve themselves from respon-
sibility for addressing societal discrimination and social inequities in ad-
dressing the causes of environmental problems.
Both the market dynamics debate and EPA's Select Steel decision
show the insufficiency of even the traditional civil rights paradigms for
course, not new. The same issue has been raised in the context of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act ("NEPA") and its environmental impact review process. There, courts
have sought to distinguish between environmental and other socio-economic impacts that
must be included in NEPA analysis. Thus, while socio-economic impacts that are con-
nected to other physical environmental impacts must be included in NEPA analysis, pure
socio-economic impacts without a connection to a physical environmental impact need not
be.
92Market dynamics theory as an explanation for disparate siting of LULUs, however,
is not the only instance where application of the anti-discrimination regulatory paradigm
cuts off traditional environmental concerns for environmental justice claims.
As Heidi Gorovitz Robertson has pointed out, the grandfathering of pollution permits
has a significant impact on racial minority communities. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, If Your
Grandfather Could Pollute, So Can You: Environmental "Grandfather Clauses" and Their
Role in Environmental Inequity, 45 CATH. U. L. RFV. 131 (1995). Here, the failure of
regulators to address such sources of pollution aggressively arises because of vested ex-
pectations by permit holders. Not unlike in other approaches to discrimination, significant
environmental and health impacts on surrounding communities are outweighed by tradi-
tional solicitude for property rights. This presents quite a contrast to the forcefulness with
which the federal government has approached clean-ups of hazardous waste sites under the
Comprehensive Emergency Response and Cleanup Liability Act ("CERCLA").
2002]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 25 2002
Harvard Environmental Law Review
evaluating environmental justice claims. Of course, the more general
problems posed by inappropriate regulatory approaches for new and un-
familiar types of claims have not been unique to environmental justice
advocates. An analogous story can be told about the structural reform
litigation that followed Brown v. Board of Education's mandate to deseg-
regate public schools. 93 They are the same structural problems that
proved the courts and common law principles incapable of addressing
modern pollution issues.
It is thus especially ironic that environmental regulators, who have
been particularly sophisticated about addressing such types of problems
in the environmental context, have failed to heed their own historical ex-
perience. By rotely relying on traditional civil rights paradigms without
consideration of how of the environmental context changes things, regu-
lators are running the risk of re-introducing concepts and approaches that
they themselves abandoned as unworkable in earlier times.
V. TAKING DISCRIMINATION AND EQUITY SERIOUSLY
A. Addressing the Tensions Between the Two Paradigms
Given that the environmental and discrimination paradigms are in
significant tension with each other, how ought we address these tensions?
At one level, we might simply attempt to change one or the other of the
two regulatory systems so as to achieve the regulatory goals that the
other paradigm seeks to address. We could accomplish this by utilizing
both regulatory approaches when they are not mutually exclusive, as one
might be tempted to do with regard to the role of courts and administra-
tive agencies in protecting the environment.94 And when the regulatory
approaches conflict or neither is satisfactory, we can instead try to design
a new system or new regulatory tools that do achieve the goals pursued
by the conflicting approaches or at least strike a reasonable balance be-
tween them.
However, that would miss a central point of the above discussion.
The question of how to address environmental protection and discrimi-
nation concerns is not simply a legal or technical regulatory question.
The legal and regulatory approaches embodied within environmental and
civil rights law and policy are premised not only on technical assess-
91 In fact, the difficulties that courts encounter in addressing systemic and past dis-
crimination problem with the tools and powers available to them has been well illustrated
by Abram Chayes. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
94 See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Protecting the Environment in the Spirit of the Com-
mon Law, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY
BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds.,
2000).
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ments of the problems that are to be solved but also on fundamental value
judgments. To the extent that conflicting technical regulatory and legal
doctrinal approaches evince fundamental value conflicts, we are forced to
make some difficult choices between them. These tensions emphasize
that the demands for "environmental justice" implicate issues much more
far-reaching than simply "fixing" environmental regulations.
Yet many of the complexities of the problem discussed here resolve
into a fundamental value choice. It is a judgment about who the primary
beneficiary of the regulatory system ought to be-in environmental law,
it is the collective as a whole, while in civil rights law it is racial or other
minority groups. This is a choice that drives most of the difference be-
tween the regulatory paradigms and without which there would otherwise
be no significant theoretical obstacles to reconciling those approaches.
For instance, the focus within environmental regulation on quantifi-
able considerations does not per se preclude the consideration of intangi-
ble values and qualitative factors, even if it does marginalize their im-
portance. In fact, the importance of some intangibles, such as the value of
endangered species and other natural resources to future generations as a
matter of aesthetics and ethical concern, has not escaped policy-makers
and environmentalists. 95 Thus, the lack of familiarity of environmental
policy-makers with anti-discrimination values should not present an in-
surmountable impediment. To the extent that incorporation of civil rights
values would lead to greater sensitivity of regulators to intangible values
more generally, it would arguably strengthen and improve environmental
regulation as a whole.
The related structural question is more difficult. Assuming that ra-
cial minority protections should be taken seriously, do environmental
regulators possess the institutional competence to consider and imple-
ment civil rights values and norms? Can and should bureaucrats be in-
volved in administering sensitive issues such as racial equality and non-
discrimination? The continued importance of common law adjudication
in civil rights protection seems to suggest the contrary.
Regulators may be familiar with technical assessments, scientific
methodology, and consensus decision-making. But that does not prepare
them for social problems that require a sense of the history of race rela-
tions, an appreciation of the sociology and psychology of inter-personal
and institutional racial dynamics, and a sensitivity to the law and politics
of the counter-majoritarian protection needs of minorities.
As a technical/scientific administrative body subject to the control of
politically elected officials, an expert agency's structure is well-suited to
address issues that command a significant amount of political consensus
95 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994); Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 470x-6 (1994). See also LEOPOLD,
supra note 39.
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and that do not require it to make delicate social value judgments. In
contrast, choosing among competing and legitimate political and social
choices is not among its strengths.
That does not absolve EPA, or other administrative agencies for that
matter, of responsibility for addressing the concerns of racial minorities
and other disenfranchised groups. And in the end, concerns about the
dangers of bureaucratization might not be as significant as they appear.
Government agencies are already involved in many areas of policy-
making and regulation that implicate important civil rights and civil lib-
erty issues, ranging from public health to education to social services.
Furthermore, the experience with race-conscious affirmative action pro-
grams are another set of experiences that can be drawn upon to appropri-
ately shape government involvement.
More importantly, the greatest risk to the interests of minorities and
the poor that arises from administrative process comes from the above-
described characteristics of administrative processes themselves, rather
than the labeling of a process as administrative or judicial. Thus, to the
extent that the characteristics of the process used to deal with minority
interests are changed to address these risks, such as through the use of
administrative adjudicative processes, the goals and values of the envi-
ronmental justice movement can be significantly advanced.96
The place of the states within the environmental regulatory and civil
rights protection system also presents tricky issues. After all, their con-
trasting historical role in promoting discrimination and protecting the
environment is reflected in national concerns about the lesser solicitude
of sub-national and local government entities to the rights of racial mi-
norities, but federal confidence in their ability to make important contri-
butions to protecting the environment. Reconciling their different rela-
tionships to the federal government seems thus like an attempt to marry
suspicion of states under civil rights laws with trust under the environ-
mental laws-a seemingly schizophrenic proposition.
In the end, the relationship between states and the federal govern-
ment hinges on resolving the question of whose interests are of primary
concern to the regulatory system-the larger collective's or minority
groups.' As noted above, the dichotomy is not just a historical artifact
rooted in the contrasting history of environmental regulation and civil
rights law.97 It is also reflective of deeper concerns about institutional
competencies and concerns related to minorities.
96 While I cannot engage in a deeper analysis of what such a process would have to
look like, at a minimum, it would need to be insulated from ordinary political and agency
pressures and adequately immersed in and cognizant of the concerns of civil rights law in
order to be effective. Some re-involvement of the courts may also be necessary as a means
of review of such mechanisms.
97 Even if the dichotomy were only an historical artifact, it would still raise some im-
portant practical considerations regarding institutional inertia to resist change.
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However, while a federal agency genuinely concerned with minority
communities cannot provide local governments with a significant and
substantive role in a minority protection scheme, that does not mean that
state and local governments must be excluded from other aspects of envi-
ronmental regulation. In any case, the regulatory activities of states and
local governments must be supervised and critically examined when alle-
gations of discrimination or inequity are raised.
Finally, the question of what the appropriate limits to regulation
ought to be again appears to raise important choices. Are there areas
where regulation is inherently inappropriate because of important com-
peting values? Notwithstanding assertions of property rights and the re-
strictions that the takings clause has imposed, the answer to that question
must largely be "no" for environmental regulation. The opposite has been
true for anti-discrimination, where values such as free speech as well as
the rights of non-minorities have resulted in significant limitations to the
reach of anti-discrimination laws and the effective scope of remedial
measures.
In many respects, these aspects of the regulatory paradigms would
appear to be the easiest to combine with regard to the achievement of the
goals and ideals of the environmental justice movement. However, such a
combination requires a choice that is different from that made by regu-
lators in the past, lest one fall into the trap of choosing the anti-
discrimination paradigm, as market dynamics theory does. It requires
environmental regulators to take the notion of an interconnected envi-
ronment, including its linkage to human society and values, and the goal
of comprehensive regulation seriously. Rather than falling into orthodox
notions that harm resulting from actions without intent is not truly a
harm, regulators must look to the actual effects on the poor and commu-
nities of color and use such impacts as the yardsticks for action.
While there are no easy solutions, most of the differences between
the paradigms would be resolvable if the political will to do so were to
exist. The only difference that cannot be resolved here is the question of
whose interests the regulatory system should put first: the collective ma-
jority or minority groups.
B. The Place of Race and Equity Within Environmental Governance
Given the fundamental value choice that one must make with regard
to the place of minority concerns within the environmental regulatory
system, how should one choose? Should concerns about especially vul-
nerable groups be elevated to the importance demanded by environmental
justice activists? This question raises important questions about the pur-
pose of environmental governance and the role of social justice consid-
erations within it.
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In light of the important environmental degradation problems that
the United States, and for that matter the world, faces, it is understand-
able why traditional environmentalism might desire to put the common
good before the "special" interests of any particular group, including ra-
cial minority groups or the poor. If we are unable to solve globally
pressing problems such as ozone depletion, climate change, or the loss of
biodiversity, we might not have an environment, or a planet, left that is
hospitable to human society. Without an effective and expeditious solu-
tion to such larger problems, there will be nothing left for racial minori-
ties or the poor to live in, or for that matter anyone else.
However, as compelling as such an argument might be, it proves too
much. It is a justification that has been heard all too often by racial mi-
norities and other disenfranchised groups-sacrifice of their interests in
the name of the common good. Too frequently, it has served as a pretext
for the exploitation or scape-goating of racial minorities. In addition, this
justification has been heard before, whether it was with regard to the le-
gality of slavery in 178798 or in 1945 with regard to the internment of
American citizens of Japanese ancestry.99
The fact is that ignoring or neglecting the interests of the disenfran-
chised in order to achieve an overriding common good is altogether too
easy an excuse. Traditional approaches to regulation, in particular envi-
ronmental regulation, have a tendency to use the good of the larger com-
munity as an excuse to take measures that are easy but that also impose
significant burdens on minorities, instead of searching for and pursuing
options that are more difficult yet more equitable. After all, protecting
minority interests in the political process is never easy, precisely because
they run contrary to those of the majority. To sacrifice the interests of the
minority in pursuit of the greater good is inevitably a means of avoiding
the true, and more difficult, question that a particular problem presents.
For government regulators and officials, doing so evades their responsi-
bility not only to minorities, but also to the larger community that be-
lieves in the ideals of equality.
Of course, I am not arguing that we should always pick the path that
will place the interests of minorities over those of the majority. I am sim-
ply arguing that such a decision should be among the choices considered
in situations where environmental and civil rights issues intersect.
In fact, the bottom line is that most of the environmental justice is-
sues that have arisen in the past have not raised those types of difficult
91 See Derrick Bell, Jr., The Real Status of Blacks Today: The Chronicle of the Consti-
tutional Contradiction, in AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 26, 26-42 (1987) (arguing that a principled position against slavery in the consti-
tutional convention was sacrificed in order to obtain the support of the slave-holding South
for the Constitution); see also PEREA ET AL., supra note 27, at 103-05 (illustrating analo-
gous arguments about slavery used in 1787 and the Civil War).
9 See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
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questions-far from it. To contend, for instance, that environmental jus-
tice claims usually force poor and minority communities to make a
choice between jobs and the environment misunderstands what the fun-
damental problem is that they face. The-jobs versus environment-di-
lemma arises when a community faces the prospect of an industrial facil-
ity that promises to create new jobs and may stimulate the local econ-
omy, while the facility will also impose health risks as well as lower the
quality of the environment due to noise, odor, traffic, and the like. Even if
the realities of life are hard, conceiving of such problems as simply a
choice of jobs versus the environment evidences a profound lack of un-
derstanding of the problem faced by environmental justice communities.
In a sense, it is a false choice. It obscures the underlying reality that mi-
nority communities and the poor have generally not been treated fairly in
the past.
What environmental justice communities demand and deserve are
not simply options that pretend that the past has not happened and that
seek to lock their subordinated and disadvantaged status into place.
Rather, they deserve a fair share of public goods, including a healthy en-
vironment and the benefits of economic development, to the same extent
that it is afforded to wealthy non-minority communities. That is the un-
derlying premise of the call for equality.
In times when the administrative state and its regulatory agencies
govern many aspects of life and channel behavior in ways that seek to
promote the public interest, the equal protection doctrine's credo "do no
harm,"1 0 or, more bluntly put, "do not intentionally discriminate,"101
seems entirely insufficient and dated. Today, the government is engaged
in myriad affirmative programs to promote and to make available public
goods. A continued failure by government to take more active steps to
remedy the harms of discriminatory effects within its programs resulting
from more amorphous forms of current-day societal discrimination or
past discrimination is as harmful as the active discrimination that was the
mark of prejudice and bigotry during the heyday of racism and segrega-
tion.
VI. CONCLUSION
At its core, environmental justice is an issue that ought to be of con-
cern not only to the kind-hearted and socially conscious. Its concerns go
to the heart of democratic governance and what it means to live in a just
society. As a result, environmental justice concerns cannot be considered
only in the narrow context of environmental regulation and its goals, as
the attempts to fit it within the existing environmental regulatory system
100 This mandate, of course, comes from the medical profession.
10, See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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have sought to do. And its goals, although most visibly identified as that
of fighting environmental racism, do not stop with the eradication of
what the U.S. Supreme Court has legally defined as intentional discrimi-
nation-actions intended to disadvantage or harm members of racial mi-
nority groups based on a racial animus. Rather, environmental justice
challenges environmental regulators to look up from their desks and envi-
ronmentalists to come out of the wilderness and to understand how envi-
ronmental protection efforts are related to broader social agendas. A fail-
ure to live up to the challenge will not only leave environmentalism
weaker as a compelling ideal, but also poorer as a moral force.
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